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Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: an
Agenda for Action [World Bank 198 laI provides the
first comprehensive example of the new post
McNamarat World Bank thinking applied to a whole
region rather than an individual country. If the Report
is representative, concern for reduction of inequalities,
provision for basic needs, and alleviation of absolute
poverty appears to have fallen in the Bank's ranking of
priorities. Equity and distribution concerns have been
supplanted by a re-emphasis upon the growth of
production, and upon the adoption of 'outward-
oriented' policies as a means of adjustment in the face
of structural balance of payments problems. This
policy change has coincided with the expansion of
general balance of payments lending by the Bank, in
support of approved 'structural adjustment' pro-
grammes. The Accelerated Development Report is the
strongest general statement to date of the policy
change. It is also the most detailed public exposition of
the kinds of programmes the Bank would be willing to
support with structural adjustment lending.
While this evolution in World Bank thinking has been
rapid and recent, the International Monetary Fund
has been moving towards a complementary position
over a longer period. Since the introduction of the
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1974 (with three
years for disbursements and up to 10 years for
repayments) the Fund has steadily increased the
volume of resources devoted to longer term
'stabilisation' or 'adjustment' programmes, and has
broadened the scope of these programmes to couple
the traditional emphasis on demand restraint with
policies directed toward easing supply constraints.
These policies normally consist of trade and payments
'Accelerated Development was in fact drafted during President
McNamaras administration. However, its tone and priorities are
distinctly different from those of his crusade against absolute
poverty.
'In the last three years, the Fund has substantially increased its total
volume of lending, and has also sharply raised the proportion of new
lending which is extended on terms of full conditionality. In Africa
attempted programmes reached record levels during 1980-81, but
disbursements have lagged because of a high rate of programme
suspension.
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liberalisation and removal of price 'distortions', rather
than measures of structural or institutional reform.2
Since the Bank tends to give structural adjustment
loans to countries that have previously arranged
programmes with the Fund,3 there is now considerable
international pressure on deficit countries to adopt
not only short-term fiscal and monetary policies but
also longer-term development strategies approved by
the Bank and the Fund.
The Report also calls for remarkably sweeping
changes in practices of bilateral donors. There is some
difference between what is implied throughout the
Report, and what is made explicit in the recom-
mendations on aid contained in the final chapter.
Nevertheless the main thrust is clear: while total aid
should be increased, bilateral donors should scale
down aid for development projects and contribute
instead to support for Bank-designed structural
adjustment programmes. It is the combination of
proposals for national policy reform with proposals
for re-direction of aid which endow the Report with
potential to have a tremendous impact - especially,
but not only, on African countries.
The Domestic Policy Diagnosis
After an opening discussion of the serious effects on
African economies of international economic develop-
ments in the 1970s; of the continuing obstacles to
development inherited as part of the colonial legacy;
and of climatic and other geographical difficulties
faced in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Report
concentrates upon three critical 'domestic policy
inadequacies' which it considers have impeded
economic growth:
first, trade and exchange rate policies have over-
protected industry, held back agriculture, and
absorbed much administrative capacity. Second,
too little attention has been paid to administrative
constraints in mobilising and managing resources
for development; given the widespread weakness of
3A Fund EFF Programme does not, however, guarantee a Bank
structural adjustment loan, as became clear in Tanzania in 1980.
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planning, decision-making, and management
capacities, public sectors frequently become over-
extended. Third, there has been consistent bias
against agriculture in price, tax and exchange rate
policies. [World Bank 1981a:4]
In looking at the implications of the Report for aid
flows and practices, it is worth pausing to consider the
origins of these three arguments.
The first is an adaptation of the World Bank's well-
taken criticism of 'inward-orientation' in trade and
exchange rate policies (summarised in World Bank
[198 lb:63-78]). This is derived from an assessment of
the comparative growth and adjustment experiences
of a number of middle-income, semi-industrial
countries during the 1970s. The argument, in brief,
runs as follows. Those countries which have adopted
liberal trade regimes (je, without significant quantit-
ative restrictions); low and uniform import tariff
structures; and measures to ensure that their real
effective exchange rates have depreciated against
those of their trading partners, are described as
'outward-oriented'. They have adjusted more rapidly,
with smaller losses of real income, than other groups
of countries. The central feature of 'outward-
orientation' is that the structure of incentives should
not discriminate between production for export and
production for the home market. 'Inward-orientation',
on the other hand, involves a high degree of protection
for import-substituting industries (whether by tariff or
quantitative restrictions); discriminatory taxation of
export production; and an appreciating real effective
exchange rate. 'Outward-oriented' policies have
enabled those countries which adopt them to
overcome a structural balance of payments deficit by
producing more goods for export. 'Inward-oriented'
policies inhibit this form óf adjustment, and therefore
throw the burden onto deflation and slower growth.
The Report argues that most African countries have
pursued 'inward-oriented' policies for far too long.
Three points should be made about this analysis. First,
the basic research following which the relative merits
of 'inward' and 'outward' orientation have been
assessed related mainly, though not exclusively, to
semi-industrial, middle income countries outside SSA,
in particular the 'newly-industrialising countries' or
NICs [see, for example, the work of Balassa 1981, 1982
and Krueger 1978]. The Report's application of these
conclusions to Africa is derivative and is based upon
internal work conducted at the World Bank. [Apart
from the Report itself, the main published examples
are Acharya and Johnston 1978, and Liebenthal
1981.]
Second, the NICs have economies in which both the
short and long run price-elasticity of supply of traded
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goods (ie exportables and importables) can be taken as
relatively high, partly because the traded goods
produced by the NICs consist of increasing shares of
manufactured goods, not primary commodities. To
argue that they may be lower in less diversified
economies, such as those of SSA, is flot the same thing
as asserting that African producers exhibit inadequate
or perverse supply response. It is rather to argue that
the structural constraints upon supply responsiveness
(land shortage, climate, access to markets etc) may be
greater. In the same vein, it can be argued that the
exchange rate will have stronger effects upon relative
prices in a more diversified economy than in one in
which the structure of relative prices is essentially
imported and domestically modified primarily by
budgetary measures and changes in real wages. The
inward/outward orientation argument revolves
around price incentives. There is an implicit
assumption in the Report's analysis that relative prices
are of equal importance in determining the structure
of production in all types of economy, and that trade
policy measures and exchange rate variations have
similar effects upon relative prices in all countries.
Third, the transition to 'outward-orientation' that is
recommended requires measures which coincide with
those the International Monetary Fund has con-
sistently urged members to adopt, in particular the
abolition of exchange restrictions and quantitative
trade controls.
The second 'domestic policy inadequacy' identified by
the Report is a tendency to over-extend the public
sector. Treatment of this issue in the Report is case
specific to SSA, and is based less on economic research
and analysis than on generalisation from the
observation of political and administrative processes
in selected cases and countries. This line of argument is
consistent with the preference for liberal trade and
payments regimes, and thus once again coincides with
the requirements of IMF stabilisation programmes. In
marked contrast to the thrust of World Bank policies
in the recent past, the Report makes very little mention
of the redistributive role of the public sector. Its
prescription for the public sector is dealt with in two
parts: first, the public sector should be less directly
involved in the production of goods and services;
second, public administration (especially the admini-
stration of economic policy and planning) should be
strengthened. The implications for aid flows are
considerable. Capital projects administered by public
agencies should give way to generalised lending to the
private sector through financial institutions, while
technical assistance for skill development and
'institution-building' in the public sector should be
increased.
The third policy problem, the bias against agriculture,
is presented as a result of the other two. It is argued
that trade and exchange rate policies have - by
protection - raised the cost of agricultural inputs,
and - by currency overvaluation - reduced the
returns to farmers, especially on exports and
secondarily on import competing foods, in terms of
domestic currency. Further, the Report observes that
administered prices, taxation and the operations of
public sector marketing authorities have diverted
resources away from agriculture. The logic of the
argument is that, for agriculture to prosper, a switch to
'outward orientation' in trade and exchange rate
policy, and dismantling public sector involvement in
productive and distributive activities should take
precedence over the allocation of more public sector
resources to agriculture. Of course, the Report is also
arguing for the allocation of an increased portion of
(diminished) budgetary resources to agriculture, but
not in the form of specific projects administered by
government agencies.4
The framework for policy reform to promote
development in the long term is based upon these three
sets of domestic policy issues. African countries'
immediate need for short term balance of payments
support is seen to be closely related to these policy
failures. 'Inward-orientation' has created industries
which are not just import-intensive, but require
imports to be priced at levels which imply exchange
rate over-valuation and low tariffs on imported
inputs. These industries thus run into severe
difficulties when there is a physical shortage of foreign
exchange, or when the domestic prices of imported
inputs rise as a result of nominal exchange rate
depreciation. The expansion of the public sector has
created capital projects in transport, communications,
education and health which encounter similar
problems of meeting recurrent and maintenance costs
in times of foreign exchange scarcity.5 In summary, the
development patterns of the recent past have increased
the demand for foreign exchange, while damaging the
capacity to earn it.
Implications for Donors
The Report's recommendations thus imply both
increased aid and policy reform. It explicitly links the
two by stressing that additional aid is not only needed
for emergency reasons, or to add to available
resources in the long term, but to ease the transition to
new policies. In other words, it is needed to support
structural adjustment. From here it is only a very short
4While the Report does not specifically say so, this may flow from its
observation that policy attention and resource allocations to agri-
culture by SSA states (and lonor agencies) grew sharply in the 1970s,
while average agricultural output growth rates fell by about a half.
5The Report is not fully consistent in respect to these sectors. Its
specific citations often call for selective expansion and enhanced
maintenance. The proposals for health, education and rural water
charges, plus lower primary school teacher salaries, seem unlikely to
offset the additional resource allocations apparently recommended.
step to the recommendation that the disbursement of
additional aid should be made conditional upon the
recipient government's adoption of a programme of
structural adjustment measures agreed with the
donor(s). The practice of conditionality has always
been an essential part of members' access to ¡MF
resources. In the Report this is broadened in scope to
encompass development assistance flows as well as
short term balance of payments support, and long-
term development policy as well as short-term demand
management measures.
The A genda for Action confronts bilateral donors (and
other multilateral or regional agencies accustomed to
disbursing project aid) with a set of radical proposals
to reform their current practices:
project aid should be scaled down, and
replaced by a larger volume of programme aid
(both of a sectoral and of a commodity
imports kind) and of general balance of
payments support;
whatever its form (projector programme), aid
should place less emphasis on new capital
projects, and more on rehabilitation, main-
tenance and recurrent cost implications of new
activities. Donors should also be willing to
support more local and recurrent costs. They
are advised to be more 'flexible' about all non-
policy restrictions on aid disbursement;
accordingly, donors should be much less
concerned about monitoring direct govern-
ment implementation of the projects which
they sponsor. Instead they should aim to see
that their financial resources are utilised
outside the public sector;
donors should be prepared to provide these
more flexible forms of support where they are
satisfied that the recipient government is
pursuing policies conducive to structural
adjustment. One way to become satisfied on
this point is to support, and allocate funds
within the framework of, a structural
adjustment programme negotiated and super-
vised by the World Bank and/or the ¡MF;
y) the total volume of aid should be greatly
increased, total Overseas Development Assis-
tance (ODA) to SSA should nearly double in
real terms between 1980 and 1990.
Apart from their domestic policy implications these
proposals accord with long-standing demands from
less developed countries not only for more aid, but for
greater flexibility in the methods of transfer. Increased
flows of foreign exchange freely available for
maintenance, rehabilitation and the recurrent costs of
development programmes have obvious advantages to
SSA countries. It would also be a major step forward
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for embattled African administrations to have to deal
with fewer individual donors, fewer differing
administrative systems, and fewer foreign-funded
projects. Upper Volta, for example, is reputed to deal
with almost as many separate donor agency missions
as there are days in a year. Under the Report's
proposals, international aid would come to resemble
more closely other forms of resource transfer (such as
commercial lending, or direct investment), and could
be more explicitly viewed as a minor redistributive
feature of the international economic system.
In all these respects, the proposals of the Report
present considerable difficulty for bilateral donors.
Their aid administrations are organised around
project aid. Thus they can reasonably claim to be
ill-equipped to appraise the macro-economic policy
and development strategy of a recipient country. The
commercial and industrial lobbies of donor countries
are likely to view any move away from the foreign
exchange financing of new capital projects with great
suspicion, even if they have sometimes been prepared
to compete for contracts in the absence of
procurement tying (as in the aid programmes of West
Germany, the Scandinavian countries and, more
recently, Japan). Parliamentary accountability in aid
budgets may be more difficult to achieve where the
closely-monitored project is not the dominant modus
operandi. Perhaps most alarming of all is the
implication that a greater proportion of aid should
become multilateral in character, at least in terms of
decisions as to allocation, even if not of formal lending
agency. This would be the practical effect of bilateral
support for structural adjustment lending organised
by the World Bank and the IMF. Amidst all these
problems, the bilateral donors face the currently
highly unwelcome proposal to increase the volume of
aid.
Aid and Conditionality
The concept of conditionality is now central to the
World Bank's efforts to convince donors that there are
alternatives to the traditional methods of disburse-
ment. In the face of past failures of recipient
government policy and administration the Report
argues that the effectiveness and accountability of aid
should be safeguarded through alternative means. It
rejects the practice of detailed intervention in the
processes of public administration, in favour of using
the leverage which aid disbursement in large quantities
can provide to force recipients to adopt general policy
measures. It is implied that these will lessen the scope
for governments to misuse aid. The issue of the
geographical allocation of a fixed quantity of aid, and
of the selection of governments deemed 'aid-worthy',
is approached by the same means. The adoption of
structural adjustment and development policy pack-
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ages along the lines proposed in the Report will serve
as the criterion for aid-worthiness.
The original purposes of conditionality attached to
¡MF lending for balance of payments support were to
ensure that a member in deficit would repay its debt,
and that it would conform to the Fund's articles of
agreement. In this sense, conditionality was simply an
extension of the covenants commonly included in loan
agreements between private lenders and borrowers.
Fund conditionality, however, soon came to be made
up of policy packages designed to ensure debt
repayment and conformity with international exchange
and trade relations rules. Given that Fund lending was
of short maturity, and designed to deal with short-
term problems, the policy packages which condition-
ality required were narrowly focused on demand
restriction (to bring about the most rapid possible
transition to external balance) and on measures to
reduce payments restrictions. In large part because the
Fund was heavily criticised for this short-term and
narrow approach, it moved into longer-term EFF
lending in 1974. More recently it has increased its own
borrowing to devote more resources to extended
programme lending in the current world recession.
The Fund has also revised its conditionality guidelines
[1979], and begun to stress the importance of 'supply
factors' in adjustment. In practice, this has meant an
increased Fund interest in public sector operations (cg
tax policy and the management of public enterprises)
and in measures to remove pricing distortions. [See
Daniel 1981 for a fuller discussion.]
The World Bank's adoption of conditionality, and its
introduction of structural adjustment lending, are
thus complementary to Fund activities, and represent
logical extensions of the development of Fund
conditionality.
The thrust of the Report's argument is that there is a
need for a large-scale shift towards the new structural
adjustment type of lending. The final chapter of the
Report, however, contains recommendations for
donors which are more modest in scope, and are
evidently constrained by current practices and
interests in aid commitment. The Report makes a plea
for an increase in non-project assistance, but
acknowledges a need for continued project lending
and calls for harmonisation of aid procedures without
explicitly asserting that these should be subordinated
to Bank-Fund structural adjustment programmes.
In fact the World Bank's own structural adjustment
lending programme has so far taken up only a small
proportion of total Bank and International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) resources. By the end of the
1981 fiscal year, the Bank had lent just over US$1 bn
for structural adjustment. This was equivalent to
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six per cent of the total World Bank and IDA lending
programme [Landell-Mills 1981 18]. Structural adjust-
ment programmes were agreed with eight countries, of
which four were from SSA (Senegal, Kenya, Mauritius
and Malawi).
Although the volume of resources devoted to these
programmes is still rather limited, the extent to which
comprehensive conditionality is involved is already
becoming clear. Table 1 provides the World Bank's
own assessment of the key components of the
programmes with the first eight countries. Unfortu-
nately, while this is a useful illustration, it does not
permit a full appreciation of the influence of Bank and
Fund policies upon the countries concerned. First,
some important measures (especially exchange rate
changes) are likely to feature explicitly only in Fund
programmes even if they are part of the policy change
package called for by the Bank. Second, other
measures may have been taken that were not explicit
conditions, but which were clearly favoured by the
international financial institutions. The World Bank is
extremely unlikely to conclude a structural adjustment
loan with a country that is not carrying out an IMF
stabilisation programme.
Recipient Responses
If this type of lending by the Bank and the Fund is to
grow, and if bilateral donors come to favour an
extension of Bank designed and orchestrated
conditionality to the disbursement of their own funds,
two questions need to be asked. First, must the new
types of lending necessarily bring with them a
programme of the type advocated in the Report?
Second, how can the sub-Saharan countries respond?
As the other articles in this Bulletin suggest, the
Report's diagnoses and prescription can be contested
from a number of different angles. It is necessary to
ask the following questions:
Is a largely uniform approach to domestic
policy appropriate across the whole range of
countries in SSA?
Is a sharp move to export-orientation justifiable
or even practicable in current and expected
international economic conditions?
Has the role of the price mechanism been over-
rated, and the importance of other structural
reforms in boosting production been under-
played?
Why have questions of income distribution
suddenly become unimportant, not only from a
welfare point of view, but also in their
relationship to the structure of production?
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The Report undoubtedly raises a set of issues which
are of immense importance given the current
economic difficulties of SSA. It is one thing, however,
for the Report to be taken as a discussion document,
but quite another if (as the Report itself implies) its
prescriptions form the core of structural adjustment
programmes which the international financial institu-
tions will support. Unless some of the questions it
raises are vigorously and critically addressed, at the
international level and when country programmes are
under consideration, structural adjustment lending
could come to be viewed as the vehicle whereby yet
another comprehensive and inappropriate policy
approach invented by development economists is
implemented. In this case the policy approach is one
with a strong ideological flavour, with potentially
serious political and social costs. The concept of
structural adjustment lending involves necessary and
overdue reforms in development assistance practices.
It can, however, be made compatible with more than
one set of policy reforms.
The directions outlined in the Report place very
different responsibilities upon the financial and
economic policy administrations of African countries
in negotiating programme aid from those previously
involved in managing a multiplicity of project aid
components. The more that Bank and Fund
adjustment lending expands, the more recipient
governments will find themselves negotiating the
framework and components of domestic economic
policy with two cooperating outside agencies, instead
of negotiating the composition of their development
expenditure programmes with a broad range of
sources. Inability to reach agreement could have
damaging effeits, so too could agreement on a
programme locally deemed to be misguided. This
dilemma was explicitly faced in Tanzania in 1981,
where it led to the appointment of what is in effect an
arbitration panel - popularly known as the 'Three
Wise Men' - to recommend a compromise course
between the proposals of the World Bank and the
government.6 In the long term, arbitration panels are
unlikely to be a satisfactory means of determining
economic policies. Governments themselves have to
face the challenge of mounting their own responses,
for their own cases, to programmes such as those
proposed by the Report. This task is in some ways
comparable to that which has been addressed over the
past 20 years or more of evolving more satisfactory
bargains with transnational corporations, but there is
potentially much more at stake. If the Report
stimulates a range of governments to take up the
challenge, it will have achieved a great deal.
6Their report in April 1982 has to be a substantial extent been
embodied in the 1982-83 Budget and Annual Plan. The Bank and
Fund response remains unclear.
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